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INTRODUCTION

During the last decade, corporate debt has flooded the market. 1
The issuance of junk bonds - high-yield, high-risk securities that are
typically rated well below investment grade - has increased at an
explosive rate, financing leveraged buyouts and other forms of acquisitions.2 In the last few years, however, the junk bond market has
experienced several serious price declines.2 Financial analysts have
*Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. B.A., 1973, Carleton College; J.D., 1976,
University of Iowa; LL.M., 1982, New York University. This project was supported by a grant
from the Law Center Foundation. I wish to thank Sharon Paxton, a recent graduate of the
University of North Carolina School of Law, for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Corporations added almost $1 trillion in debt during the 1980s, with interest payments
absorbing up to 30% of their cash flow. See Farrell & Nathans, The Bills Are Coming Due,
Bus. WK., Sept. 11, 1989, at 85. Illustrative of the high rate of increase in corporate debt
during this period is the fact that nonfinancial companies nearly doubled the amount of their
debt between 1982 and 1988. Farrell, Learning to Live With Leverage, Bus. WK., Nov. 7, 1988,
at 138; see also Taking the Strain of America's Leverage, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 5, 1988, at 87;
Vasoff, LBO's, Junk Bonds and Poison Pills, CA. MAG., Dec. 1988, at 11.
2. See Farrell & Nathans, supra note 1, at 85 (junk bond market grew at an explosive 34%
annualized rate between 1981 and 1989); Wintder, PoorResults in '89 May Show Profit Erosion
for Junk Bonds, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1990, at R26, col. 1 (during the 1980s, junk bond market
grew to $210 billion from less than $2 billion at the start of the 1980s).
3. The junk bond market suffered serious price shocks after Ivan Boesky's guilty plea on
insider trading charges in November 1986 and following the stock market crash in October 1987.
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attributed the market fall to a variety of causes, including rising interest rates of less risky investments, an excess supply of junk bonds
and an increasing number of defaults by issuers. 4 Many commentators
predict that the junk bond market will remain in serious disarray,
especially if overleveraged firms are forced to deal with an economic
recession. .,
As prices of junk bonds have plummeted, more issuers have taken
advantage of the opportunity to repurchase their outstanding debt at
significant discounts., The general rule for tax purposes is that the
issuer realizes gain on such a transaction when the repurchase price
is less than the "issue price," which typically is equal to the initial
value of the debt.7 A case decided two years ago by the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has introduced a dramatically dif-

Weiss, Does Junk Have Lasting Value? Probably, Bus. WK., May 1, 1989, at 118. The market
also nosedived during the summer of 1988. Bremner, Interco: Another Day Older and $1.4
Billion in Debt, Bus. WK., Jan. 22, 1990, at 58.
The most distressing junk bond performance of the decade, however, occurred in 1989. First,
there was a market break in April 1989. Newport, Junk Bonds Face the Big Unknozn, FORTUNE, May 22, 1989, at 129. The market then crashed in September, following the announcement
of Campeau Corporation's financial problems. Zigas & Light, Don't Put Away the Smelling
Salts Yet, Bus. WK., Oct. 2, 1989, at 92.
4. See Newport, supra note 3, at 129 (the price declined in April 1989 due to the narrowing
of the difference between the yield on junk bonds and on risk-free Treasury bonds as interest
rates rose on the latter); Serwer, How to Find Gems in a Rough Bond Market, FORTUNE,
Jan. 1, 1990, at 25 (highly publicized defaults caused investors to exit the market in droves,
driving down prices); Hilder, Finns Begin Cash Offers for Junk, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1990,
at 15, col. 1 (lack of buyers helped push prices to unusually depressed levels).
5. See, e.g., Mitchell, Junk Market Could Stay in Disarray:But Buy-Backs Are Ray qf
Hope, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1990, at Cl, col. 3; Winkler, Jitnk Bond Market Is Seen Showing
38% Default Rate, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1990, at CIO, col. 1; Junk Bond Default Rate Expected
to Rise in 1990, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1990, at ClI, col. 6; Hylton, CorporateBond Defaults Up
Sharply in'89, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at D17, col. 4.
6. See, e.g., Light & Nathans, Corporate America Wants Out from Under Its Jnk Pile,
Bus. WK., Aug. 21, 1989, at 80-81. The first quarter of 1990 saw "a flock of companies buying
back their own depressed junk bonds." Mitchell, supra note 5, at Cl, col. 3; see also Mitchell,
Junk Buy-Backs Take Off, Issuers Spring at Discounts, Wall St. J., June 1, 1990, at C1, col.
3; Hilder, supra note 4, at C1, col. 6; Mitchell & Raghavan, Junk Bonds Rebound, Post Gains,
Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1990, at C19, col. 1.
7. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(3) (CCH 1990). Under that regulation, the issue price is
adjusted by adding any amount of discount already deducted or subtracting any premium already
included as income. Id. The regulations under I.R.C. § 61 do not define "issue price" but typically
it is defined to mean the value of the consideration received in exchange for the debt. See
Blattner, Debt Cancellation, 30th N.Y.U. Inst. 237, 241-42 (1971). That amount generally will
be equivalent to the value of the debt on issuance. The definition of "issue price" for cancellationof-debt purposes was the question posed in United States Steel.
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ferent rule for corporations repurchasing debt that originally was issued to shareholders.
In United States Steel Corp. v. United States,8 the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals held that United States Steel realized no gain when
it repurchased for cash its own outstanding debt at a significant discount from the value of the debt when issued. 9 The opinion appeared
inconsistent with long-standing precedent in the cancellation-of-debt
area. 10 However, the court distinguished the facts in United States

Steel on the grounds that the debt in that case originally had been
issued to shareholders in exchange for their stock rather than to third
party creditors in exchange for cash.,,
In such a case, the court held, the repurchase of the debt could

not simply be related back to its issuance, with gain computed by
deducting the repurchase price of the debt from the value of the
consideration received in exchange for the debt. Instead, the repurchase of the debt must be related back to the original issuance of the
stock, which had occurred more than seventy years earlier.12 Gain
from the repurchase of the debt should occur, according to the court,
only if the entire transaction, from the issuance of the stock to the
repurchase of the debt, increased the debtor's assets. If the repurchase
price exceeded the capital originally paid in for the stock, as it did in
United States Steel, the court held that no gain resulted regardless

of the debt's decline in value.13
The opinion, which reversed the holding of the Claims Court, generated considerable controversy.1 4 Despite the debate on the theoret-

8. 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
9. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1238.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), where the Supreme
Court held that a debtor realized taxable gain upon the discharge of debt at less than its face
amount.
11. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1236.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1236-37.
14. A series of articles debating the United States Steel case appeared in Tax Notes. See
Gunn, Reconciling United States Steel and Kirby Lumber, 42 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS)
851 (Feb. 13, 1989) [hereinafter Gunn, Reconciling]; Shakow, United States Steel and Kirby
Lumber: Another View, 42 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1371 (Mar. 13, 1989); Gunn, United
States Steel and the FunctionalApproach to Legal Problems, 43 TAX NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS)
213 (Apr. 10, 1989) [hereinafter Gunn, The Functional Approach]; Shakow, A Short Retort on
United States Steel, 43 TAx NOTES (TAx ANALYSTS) 1173 (May 29, 1989); Gunn, Gunn's
Reply, 43 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 1174 (May 29, 1989); see also Peyser, Determining
Income from Cancellationof Indebtedness, 66 TAXES 866 (1988); Pisem, More on United States
Steel Corporation, 43 TAX NOTES (TAX ANALYSTS) 144 (June 12, 1989).
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ical correctness of the court's holding, however, scholars paid little
attention to the practical impact of the court's decision. With the
collapse of the junk bond market and the increasing popularity of
issuer repurchases, the United States Steel decision has become much
more significant.
Under the holding in United States Steel, a corporate issuer repurchasing bonds that were issued to shareholders in redemption of stock
will escape the realization of gain except in the rare case in which the
repurchase price is less than the amount originally paid in for the
stock.15 If the bonds were issued to shareholders as dividends, United
States Steel provides authority for the issuer to realize no gain on the
repurchase of the debt regardless of the size of the discount.e

15. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1236.
16. See id.; see also Rail Joint Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1277, 1278-79 (1931) (corporation realized no gain when it repurchased at a discount notes that it previously had distributed
to shareholders as dividends), affd, 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932). For a discussion of Rail Joint,
see infra text accompanying notes 81-104. The Federal Circuit in United States Steel relied
upon the Rail Joint decision in its opinion. United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1236.
One commentator has argued that the question in United States Steel, i.e., the issue price
of debt that originally is issued in exchange for or with respect to stock, has now been resolved
statutorily. See Pisem, supra note 14, at 1415. This argument is based upon the section of the
Internal Revenue Code that defines "issue price" for purposes of the determination of original
issue discount. I.R.C. § 1273(b (1990) (unless otherwise stated all references to the Internal
Revenue Code will be to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended and in effect for 1990).
Under § 1273(b)(3), the issue price of debt issued for property (including stock or securities) is
defined as the fair market value of the property where the debt or the stock or securities for
which the debt is exchanged are traded on an established securities market. I.R.C. § 1273(b)(3).
Under I.R.C. § 1275(a)(5), debt issued with respect to stock is treated as if it had been issued
for property. I.R.C. § 1275(a)(5). Accordingly, § 1273 would appear to define the issue price of
debt distributed as a dividend -o be the fair market value of the debt if it was traded on an
established securities market. See I. R.C. § 1273(b)(3). If the definition under § 1273 had controlled
for cancellation-of-indebtedness purposes, the Federal Circuit's decision in United States Steel
(holding that the issue price of' the debt was the amount received initially for the preferred
stock) clearly would be inconsistent with the statute, and that court would have affirmed the
Claims Court decision (holding that the issue price of the debt was the fair market value of the
preferred stock, which was publicly traded).
Section 1273, however, specifically states that its definition of issue price applies "for purposes
of this subpart." I.R.C. § 1273(b). That subpart (subpart A, part V, subchapter P) does not
include § 61, which governs the question of cancellation-of-indebtedness income. I.R.C. §
61(a)(12). Although the limiting language in the statute defining issue price for original issue
discount purposes did not exist at the time of the decision in United States Steel, the Federal
Circuit did not apply that definition of issue price, reasoning that a different analysis was
necessary depending upon whether the question was one of original issue discount or cancellationof-indebtedness income. United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1237-38.
Pisem argues that changes since the relevant date in United States Steel (1966, when the
bonds were issued) make it clear that the original issue discount definition should now control
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Since many junk bonds originally were issued to shareholders in
the course of takeovers or as dividends, 17 the decision in United States
Steel could result in a substantial tax revenue cost to the government.
In addition, the United States Steel decision introduces an unwarranted
and unnecessary distinction between corporations that have achieved
identical results in different ways. A corporation that borrows from
third parties to finance either stock redemptions or dividends will be
subject to tax on a later repurchase of the debt to the extent that
the repurchase price is less than the amount of the borrowed cash.'Under United States Steel, however, a corporation that borrows directly from its shareholders, issuing the same amount of debt to finance
stock redemptions or dividends, will receive much more favorable
treatment on a subsequent repurchase of that debt. For a corporation
borrowing from shareholders, the amount borrowed will be irrelevant;

questions of cancellation-of-indebtedness income. Pisem, supra note 14, at 1415. Specifically, he
points to the fact that controversy no longer exists in the courts (as it did in 1966, despite the
broad language of the statute) about whether original issue discount could arise when debt is
issued in exchange for property. Id. He also points to the changes in the cancellation of-indebtedness regulations under § 61, which now make explicit reference to the original issue discount
definition of issue price. Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(4) (CCH 1990) (citing the definition
of "issue price" in the regulations under § 1232, the statute that previously defined "issue price"
for purposes of original issue discount). Although the reference is in connection with computing
bond premium, Pisem argues that since bond premium is an adjustment to issue price for § 61
purposes, the reference implies that the Treasury intended that the original issue discount
definition of "issue price" control for all purposes. Pisem, supra note 14, at 1415.
It is not clear that a court in a future case would agree with Pisem's argument and conclude
that the question posed in United States Steel - the amount of gain realized by a corporation
that repurchased debt which originally had been issued in exchange for stock - has been
answered definitively by the relevant statute and regulations. Certainly, a court could decide
that Congress has not addressed the question because the statutory definition of "issue price"
is specifically applicable only to the computation of original issue discount. I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1).
Furthermore, attorneys have made strong arguments that the rules governing original issue
discount and cancellation of indebtedness are based on fundamentally different theories, so that
"issue price" should have different meanings in the two contexts. See Reply Brief for Appellant
at 18-19, United States Steel v. United States, 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
This article attempts to provide a theoretical basis for determining the question of cancellationof-indebtedness income under the United States Steel facts.
17. See D. POsIN, CORPORATE TAX PLANNING 949-1304 (1990). Posin describes some
transactions in which junk bonds were to be issued directly to shareholders. See id. at 1064
(U.S.G. Corporation/Desert Partners); id. at 1118 (Trans World Airlines/Icahn); id. at 1212
(Malrite). Dividend distributions of a corporation's own debt have become increasingly popular
recently as a takeover defense, with the new debt making the company less attractive to a
raider. See D. POSIN, supra, at 303.
18. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(3) (CCH 1990) (requiring adjustments to the issue price
for previously deducted discount or previously reported premium).
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gain will never be realized on a repurchase of debt issued directly as
a dividend and only rarely on a repurchase of debt issued in redemption

of stock.
The disparate treatment resulting from the holding in United States
Steel extends beyond solvent corporations that repurchase debt at a
discount. It also significantly impacts insolvent or bankrupt firms that
default on junk bonds, an occurrence that has become increasingly
frequent in the last few years.1 9 Once again, a corporation that finances
redemptions or dividends by issuing debt to shareholders will receive
more favorable treatment than a corporation that issues debt to third
parties, and subsequently distributes the borrowed cash to shareholders.
While neither corporation will be subject to tax on gain from the
cancellation of debt, the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 requires that a
corporation's tax attributes, representing tax benefits in the future,
be reduced by the gain that would have been recognized were it not
for the insolvency or bankruptcy.2° Under United States Steel, that
gain would be computed differently depending only upon the form of
the prior dividend or redemption transaction. 21 The two corporations
thus will reduce their tax attributes by different amounts, despite the
fact that the issuance of the debt in the two cases achieved identical
results. The corporation that issued the debt directly to its shareholders will emerge from bankruptcy with an unwarranted "head start,"
22
a result inconsistent with the goals of the Bankruptcy Tax Act.

19. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 5, at D1, col. 3; Winkler, supra note 2, at R26, col. 1;
Vise & Mufson, Defaults Add to Burden of Buyouts: Heavy Debts Strain Leveraged Companies,
Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1989, at As, col. 1; Sandler, Junk Bond Defaults Are Spreading;Investors
Debate Next Casnalties, Wall St. J., July 20, 1989, at C1, col. 4.
20. See I.R.C. § 108(a), (b). See generally B. BITTKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION
OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
6.4.6 (2d ed. 1989).
21. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1236. If the corporation had borrowed from a third
party creditor and distributed the loan proceeds to shareholders as dividends or in redemption
of stock, the gain that would have been recognized, were it not for the insolvency or bankruptcy,
will be the cash borrowed (typically equal to the original value of the debt) plus any deductions
that the corporation had taken as original issue discount. In the case of debt issued to shareholders
as dividends, the issue price as determined under United States Steel would be zero, since the
corporation received no new assets in exchange for the debt. In the case of debt issued in
redemption of stock, the issue price under United States Steel would be the amount originally
paid in for the stock rather than the initial value of the debt. See infra text accompanying notes
51-59.
22. In connection with the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980, Treasury representatives and
others, testifying in favor of deferral of gain through attribute reduction instead of total exclusion,
argued that a bankrupt debtor was entitled to a "clean slate" but not to undue tax advantages.
See, e.g., The Bankruptcy Tax Act: Hearing on H.R. 5043 Before the Subcomm. on Select
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Clearly, the tax law has other instances in which taxpayers are
treated differently depending on the form of the transaction, even
though the different transactions achieved identical results. 2
Nevertheless, most would agree that such distinctions lead to increased
levels of manipulation and complexity which, although sometimes inevitable, are unfortunate. The need for certainty justifies some distinctions based on form, while other distinctions result from judicial attempts to adhere to congressional intent.2 Neither rationale, however,
applies to the distinction produced by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion in United States Steel, which cannot be defended on
the grounds of theory, policy or statutory language.
This article will show that the holding in United States Steel was
wrong and displays a general misunderstanding of both the cancellation-of-indebtedness area and the corporate tax base. In its opinion,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals justified cancellation-of-indebtedness income on the grounds of a net increase in the debtor's assets,
concluding that gain would result only when cash received by the
debtor exceeded cash paid. Since the firm in United States Steel had
received "no new capital" on the issuance of the debt in exchange for
the stock, the court made the cash comparison by relating the repurchase of the debt back to the original issuance of the stock.- That

Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1979)
(statement of Daniel Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Department of the
Treasury). Under the Federal Circuit's decision in United States Steel, bankrupt debtors who
issued debt directly to shareholders would be given undue tax advantages over those who
borrowed from third parties and distributed the proceeds to shareholders.
23. E.g., I.R.C. § 332. This section provides that a corporation will not recognize gain or
loss on the liquidation of a subsidiary if it owns more than 80% of the subsidiary. Id. If, however,
the parent corporation sells enough of its stock to reduce its holdings below 80% and then
liquidates, the parent corporation generally will recognize gain or loss on the sale and on the
liquidation under I.R.C. § 331. See Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 676 (lst
Cir. 1956) (stating that there was, in the context of § 332, "a legislative understanding...
that taxpayers can, by taking appropriate steps, render the subsection applicable or inapplicable
as they choose"); B. BITTKER &J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
11.41 (5th ed. 1987); see also examples cited in Guerin, A Proposed
AND SHAREHOLDERS
Testfor EvaluatingMultiparty Like Kind Exchanges, 35 TAX L. REV. 547 (1979-80); Isenbergh,
Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation (Book Review), 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 869
n.47 (1982) (reviewing B. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS
(1981)) (asserting that the Code creates numerous tax differences between economically equivalent transactions).
24. See Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 149-51
(1974); Blum, The Importance of Form in the Taxation of Corporate Transactions, 54 TAXES
613, 614 (1976); Guerin, supra note 23, at 559.
25. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1236.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

conclusion, however, ignores the effect to the corporation of the issuance of the debt to its shareholders and is inconsistent with the
corporate tax base under current law.
This article illustrates that corporate income, which underlies the
corporate tax base, is not measured by asset increases alone. Rather,
corporate income under current law includes both distributions to
shareholders and changes in corporate net worth. 26 A corporation's
distributions to shareholders are analogous to an individual taxpayer's
expenditures for consumption: both transactions reduce the taxpayer's
retained assets, and yet both are nondeductible and require the use
of after-tax dollars.27
The decisive point here is that increases in corporate income,
whether represented by distributions to shareholders or by increases
in net worth, must be taxed in order to maintain the corporate tax
base. As explained below, shareholder contributions to the corporate
entity are excluded from the tax base,2 but any other increase in
corporate income must be regarded as corporate gain, taxable when
realized.
Given the inclusion of distributions to shareholders in corporate
income, a corporation that issues its debt to shareholders, achieving
either a dividend distribution or a redemption of stock, should be
deemed to have realized economic benefit to the full extent of the
value of the debt when issued. If the debt subsequently declines in
value, the debtor will enjoy an increase in net worth and so in corporate
income. If the corporation subsequently repurchases the debt at a
discount, the corporation will realize the increase in income to the
extent of the discount and must be taxed. Otherwise, the corporation
will accomplish the prior distribution to shareholders out of pre-tax
dollars to the extent of the discount, a result that is clearly inconsistent
with the corporate tax base. Arguments made by United States Steel
and by commentators against taxing the discount are based upon incorrect reasoning and faulty precedent.29
As the number of junk bond buy-backs and defaults increases, the
potential revenue impact and the discriminatory effect of the incorrect
decision in United States Steel escalate. It is hoped that the next court
faced with the United States Steel issue will disregard the Uvited
States Steel opinion and instead embrace the conclusion described in
this article, one that is consistent with the current theoretical structure
of the tax code.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See
See
See
See

infra text
infra text
infra text
infra text

accompanying
a-companying
accompanying
accompanying

notes 63-66.
notes 67-69.
note 66.
notes 81-133.
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II.

THE FACTS AND OPINIONS IN UNITED STATES STEEL

In 1901, United States Steel issued its $100 par value preferred
stock receiving $100 cash in exchange.3 0 In 1966, it recapitalized and
exchanged newly-issued debentures with a face value of $175 for the
outstanding preferred stock.3 1 Both the stock and the debt (on a whenissued basis) were trading on the New York Stock Exchange for
approximately $165 when the exchange took place.- The transaction
was tax-free to the company,s but United States Steel advised its
shareholders that they would realize a taxable gain upon redemption
of their stock to the extent that the $165 value of the debt exceeded
their basis in the stock.3
Six years later, when the debentures had significantly declined in
value, United States Steel was able to repurchase them on the open

30. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1233. The actual amount received by United States
Steel in exchange for the preferred stock was in dispute, with the corporation claiming that it
had received only $96.375 per share. See United States Steel v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 375,
377 n.7 (1986), opinion on reconsideration,11 Cl. Ct. 541 (1987). The government claimed that
more proof was necessary to determine the exact amount of cash paid for the stock. Id. However,
for ease of reference, the parties assumed during the case that the company had received an
amount equal to the $100 par value of the shares. See Appellant's Brief at 5 n.2, United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1611). The Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals made that same assumption in its opinion. United States Steel, 848 F.2d at
1233. The exact amount received for the preferred stock was irrelevant to the taxpayer's argument, since, under its argument, no income would be realized as long as that amount was less
than the amount paid to repurchase the debt. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 24, United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1611). The exact amount
was also irrelevant to the government's argument, under which the face amount of the debt
was the figure with which to compare the repurchase price. See United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct.
at 377-78.
31. United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1233. The debentures, which bore interest at the rate
of four and five-eighths percent, were to be issued only in denominations or multiples of $100,
with cash paid to holders of fractional shares. Shareholders who held five shares or less could
elect to receive all cash for their shares, at the rate of $175 per share. The debentures were
nonredeemable for 10 years and were due in 1996. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 376 n.3.
The purpose of the recapitalization, which was effected by a merger of United States Steel
into a subsidiary, was to change the place of incorporation in addition to restructuring capital.
See id. at 376.
32. United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1233. On the effective date of the merger, the preferred
stock was trading at $165, while the debentures (which had been actively traded for over a
month on a when-issued basis) were trading at an amount that correlated to approximately $165
1/8 per each $175 face amount debenture. See Appellee's Brief at 4-5, United States Steel Corp.
v. United States, 848 F.2d 1232 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1611).
33. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1233. No dispute arose concerning the tax-free
nature of the exchange to the company. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 377.
34. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 377.
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market for cash equal to approximately $118 for each $175 debenture. 3
The question in the case was whether United States Steel realized
any income from its repurchase of the debt - whether the repurchase
price of $118 was less than the "issue price."36 Under the regulations
37
(then and now), that difference is taxable to the debtor.
United States Steel argued that the $100 cash received on the
original issue of the stock should be regarded as the "issue price" of
the debt.;* According to the taxpayer, gain from cancellation of a debt
should depend upon an increase in assets resulting from the borrowing
transaction. In this case, the taxpayer had received no new assets
when it had issued the debt in exchange for the preferred stock; the
only asset ever received by United States Steel in the entire transaction was the cash paid in for the stock. A net asset increase, or
economic gain as defined by the taxpayer, thus could be computed
only by comparing that amount to the repurchase price.3 9
In United States Steel, the taxpayer had paid more to repurchase
the debt than it originally had received for the stock. United States
Steel argued that the transaction taken as a whole (considering the
transaction from the cash receipt on the issuance of the stock in 1901
until the cash payment on the repurchase of the debt in 1972) really
constituted a loss to the corporation since it had suffered a net reduction in assets.4 0 Under these circumstances, according to the taxpayer,

35. United States Steel, &8 F.2d at 1233. The taxpayer originally reported the difference
between the face amount of the bonds and the repurchase price as income, but subsequently
filed a timely claim for refund. See id.
36. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 378.
37. The Treasury Regulations in effect when United States Steel acquired the debentures
in 1972 provided:
If bonds are issued by a corporation and are subsequently repurchased by the
corporation at a price which is exceeded by the issue price plus any amount of
discount already deducted, or (in the case of bonds issued subsequent to Feb. 28,
1913) minus any amount of premium already returned as income, the amount of
such excess is income for the taxable year.
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(3) (1972). The current regulation is in substance the same. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(3) (CCH 1990).
38. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 378.
39. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-10, United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1232.
40. See United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 378 n.12. The taxpayer cited the Supreme Court
case of Bowers v. Kerbaugh Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 (1926), to support its claim that the
transaction as a whole must be examined to see if an economic gain had been realized. See
United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 378 n.12; Appellant's Brief at 15 n.7, United States Steel, 848
F.2d at 1232.
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the corporation could not be deemed to have realized an economic
gain.

41

The Claims Court disagreed with the taxpayer. It also rejected
the government's view that United States Steel should have income
to the extent the $175 face amount of the debt (which was greater
42
than its value when issued) exceeded the $118 repurchase price.
Instead, the court held that the value of the consideration received
upon issuance of the debt should be regarded as the "issue price"
under the regulations. In this case, that consideration was the preferred stock, valued at $165 at the time of the exchange. According to
the Claims Court, the difference between the deemed issue price of
$165 and the repurchase price of $118 constituted taxable income to
4
United States Steel. 3

41. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 378. The taxpayer relied heavily on the case of Fashion
Park, Inc. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 600 (1954). The corporation in that case had issued $50
par value preferred stock for $5 a share. Fashion Park, 21 T.C. at 601. Subsequently, the
preferred stock was redeemed for bonds with a $50 face amount. Id. The corporation later
repurchased the bonds for an amount less than $50 but more than $5. Id.
In FashionPark, the government did not dispute the contention that the issue price of the
bonds was $5, the amount initially paid in for the stock. Id. at 603. Instead, the government
argued that the issue price was irrelevant, and that gain should be realized to the extent that
the face amount of the bonds exceeded the repurchase price. Id. at 603-04. The Tax Court
rejected the government's argument. Id. at 604. The court relied on United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931), as holding that cancellation of indebtedness depends upon an
increase in assets, so that the issue price (representing consideration received for the debt)
rather than the face amount would be the relevant figure with which to compare the repurchase
price. See FashionPark, 21 T.C. at 606-07.
The Claims Court in United States Steel found that Fashion Park was not relevant to its
decision since the government in that case had conceded the issue price as being the amount
paid in for the preferred stock, while in the instant case, the government had made no such
concession. See United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 381. The Federal Circuit, however, concluded
that the government's concession in Fashion Park implied an acceptance of the conceded issue
price as the correct figure. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1235.
42. See United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 542. In its first opinion, the United States Claims
Court interpreted the government's position as being that United States Steel should realize
income only to the extent that the repurchase price was less than the value of the preferred
stock received on issuance of the debt. See id. at 378. After the court's decision, the government
moved for reconsideration, contending that it had argued consistently that gain should be realized
to the extent the repurchase price was less than the face amount of the bonds. See id. at 541.
While the court granted the government's motion, it did not change its decision upon reconsideration. See id. at 542. The government did not challenge the court's ruling on appeal. See
United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1234.
43. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 385. The court noted that, under the applicable
regulations, any previously deducted original issue discount would be added to the issue price
for the computation of taxable income. Id. Apparently, United States Steel originally had claimed
the difference between the $175 face of the debt and its initial $165 value as original issue
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The Claims Court based its decision 44 on the Supreme Court opinion
in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co.,4 in which a corporate debtor
realized gain when it repurchased its bonds at a discount from face
value.46 In applying Kirby Lumber, the Claims Court relied on an
article, written more than forty years after the decision, which revealed that the taxpayer in Kirby Lumber actually had received preferred stock for its debt instead of cash, a fact that previously had
been unrecognized by either courts or commentators.47 The Claims
Court in United States Steel saw it as relevant that the Supreme
Court had not considered the amount originally paid in for the preferred stock but had looked only at the value of the consideration received
on issuance of the debt.48
In Kirby Lumber, the parties had stipulated that the bonds "were
issued at par," so that, the consideration received for the debt was
assumed to be equal to the face value of the debt. Under these facts,
the Supreme Court found that the taxpayer realized a gain to the
extent that the face value of the debt exceeded the repurchase price.49
The Claims Court cited Kirby Lumber for the rule that the cancellation
of a debt results in a gain because assets previously offset by the
obligation become available to the taxpayer. The court went on to
hold, however, that when the consideration received upon the issuance
of the debt is less than the face amount (as in United States Steel),

discount and had taken deductions based on that amount over the period the debt was outstanding. These deductions were disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service on audit. See Appellant's
Brief at 9, United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1232.
In reaching its decision in United States Steel, the United States Claims Court discussed
the government's argument that cases determining the "issue price" of debt for purposes of
original issue discount should be relevant in determining the "issue price" of debt for cancellationof-indebtedness purposes. See United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 384. According to the government, these cases established that the amount paid in for the preferred stock would set a "floor"
for the "issue price" but that if the value of the stock at the time of the exchange of stock for
debt had increased to more than that, the higher figure would control. See id. at 384. While
the Claims Court stated that these cases provided collateral support for its conclusion, it did
not find it necessary to adopt the government's argument on this point in order to reach its
decision. See id. at 384-85.
44. Id. at 385.
45. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
46. Id. at 3.
47. See United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 381-83 (relying on Bittker, Income From the
Cancellationof Indebtedness: A HistoricalFootnote to the Kirby Lumber Co. Case, 4 J. Coiw.
TAX'N 124 (1977)).
48. United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 378.
49. Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. at 3.
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the gain would be limited to the difference between the consideration
actually received and the repurchase price. 5°
On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
Claims Court in United States Steel and accepted the taxpayer's argument that it had not realized a gain on the cancellation of the debt.5'
The court cited Kirby Lumber and other lower court decisions for the
principle that an increase in a taxpayer's assets is the critical determinant of whether cancellation of a debt results in gain. 52 According to
the court, the term "issue price" had to be interpreted in light of that
standard. 3
In United States Steel, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the "issue price" of the debt was the amount originally received
for the preferred stock.- Since the corporation had received "no new
capital" on the issuance of the debt, the $100 cash paid in for the
preferred stock was the only asset increase that resulted from the
transaction. 5 Comparing that amount to the $118 cash paid to retire
the debt showed that the overall effect was a reduction in the assets
of the corporation. Without an overall asset increase, the court con57
cluded that no gain could result.

50.

United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 380.

51. United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1238.
52. Id. at 1235-36. In addition to Kirby Lumber, the major cases relied upon by the Federal
Circuit were St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 444 F.2d 1102 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1017 (1971); Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co., 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932); Fashion Park, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 21 T.C. 600 (1954). United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1235-36.
53. Id. at 1236.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Id. The Federal Circuit also referred to cases which considered the issue price of debt
that was exchanged for stock in determining the existence of original issue discount. According
to the government, cases in this context had held that the issue price of the debt would be the
fair market value of the stock. Id. at 1237.
Because the court in United States Steel concluded that the focus of the inquiry was different
in bond discount and cancellation-of-indebtedness cases, it did not regard these cases as controlling authority. Id. at 1237-38. Nevertheless, the court did consider the Supreme Court's decision
in the context of original issue discount as "helpful." Id. at 1238. In Commissioner v. National
Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134 (1974), the Supreme Court refused to allow
the corporation a deduction for original issue discount on debt that had been issued in exchange
for preferred stock. Id. at 155. The corporation claimed that the value of the stock was significantly below the face value of the debt. Id. at 140. The Court disallowed the deduction on the
theory that the firm had not incurred "any additional cost for the use of capital" by exchanging
stock for debt, but simply had replaced one form of capital with another. Id. at 151. The Supreme
Court went on to state that the exchange of stock for debt had neither increased nor decreased
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Under the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States Steel, a corporation will not realize gain on the repurchase of debt that was issued to shareholders in exchange for their
stock unless the cash paid on repurchase is less than the cash previously received by the corporation on the original issuance of the stock,
so that the corporation realizes a net increase in its assets.s Further,
under the court's decision, a corporation that issued debt to its shareholders as a dividend, receiving no assets in exchange, will not realize
gain on either a repurchase or a cancellation of the debt. III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Corporate Income and the Corporate Tax Base

Traditionally, the realization of income on the cancellation of debt
is justified on the theory that otherwise the debtor receives an untaxed
economic benefit. Under this explanation, the debtor received the
economic benefit, typically cash or property, upon incurring the debt,
but was not taxed because of the obligation to invest an equivalent
amount of after-tax capital on repayment. If the debtor ultimately
repays less than promised (i.e., the debt is cancelled or repurchased
at a discount), the previous treatment of the cash or property received
in the year of the borrowing was unjustified. Requiring realization of
gain on the cancellation of the debt reverses the prior exclusion and
assures that the debtor does not receive an economic benefit free from
tax.60
In United States Steel, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals applied
this analysis, focusing on prior economic benefit to the debtor as the
justification for cancellation-of-debt income. 61 In the context of a corporate debtor, the court defined economic benefit solely in terms of
an increase in the debtor's assets. 62 That narrow definition, however,

corporate assets. Id. at 152. It was that statement that the court in United States Steel found
"helpful" in reaching its conclusion on the cancellation-of-indebtedness issue. See United States
Steel, 848 F.2d at 1238.
58. See id. at 1234-36.
59. See id. at 1236. In this case, under the Federal Circuit's decision in United States Steel,
the issue price for cancellation-of-indebtedness purposes would be zero. See id. (citing and relying
upon Rail Joint Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1277 (1931), affd, 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932).
For a discussion of the Rail Joint decision, see infra text accompanying notes 81-104.
60. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1983); M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
3.02 (5th ed. 1988); Bittker & Thompson, Income From the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CALIF. L.
REV. 1159, 1159-60 (1978).
61. See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1236.
62. Id.
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is inconsistent with both the corporate tax base and the underlying
formulation of corporate income.
The current structure of taxation on corporations and their shareholders is one of double tax. Gain accruing to shareholders through
their interest in the entity is taxed twice: once when it is realized by
the shareholders, either through distributions or stock sales, and once
when it is realized by the corporate entity.63
Under this system, corporate income (which forms the basis of the
current corporate tax) is defined with reference to the shareholders:
corporate income is gain accruing to the corporate entity over and
above the after-tax investments of its shareholders.2 This definition
is based upon the exclusion from corporate tax of shareholder contributions to the extent of their capital investments and on the nondeductibility of distributions to shareholders.6 Corporate income reflects and
is matched by gain to the shareholders, and it is the essence of the
double tax system to tax that gain at both the shareholder and the
corporate level.
Since corporate income is measured by shareholder gain during
any specific period, two major components must be included in the
corporate income formula: corporate distributions to shareholders during the period and changes in corporate net worth, or amounts accumulated for future distributions to shareholders. Advances from shareholders, or additional capital investments by them, are subtracted
from the computation. Corporate income is then defined as (1) net
distributions to shareholders (distributions minus advances), plus (or
minus), (2) changes in corporate net worth.66 Under this formula,

63. The double tax system has been criticized, and proposals to integrate the individual
and corporate tax structures have gained strong support. See, e.g., McLure, Integration of the
Personaland CorporateIncome Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,
88 HARv. L. REV. 532, 549-74 (1975); Warren, The Relation and Integrationof Individual and
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719, 769-72 (1981).
64. See Bryan, Cancellation of Indebtedness by Issuing Stock in Exchange: Challenging
the CongressionalSolution to Debt-Equity Swaps, 63 TEx. L. REv. 89, 114-20 (1984); see also
Crane, Toward a Theory of the Corporate Tax Base: The Effect of a CorporateDistribution of
Encumbered Property to Shareholders, 44 TAx L. REv. 113, 143 (1988) (endorsing the concept
that "the corporate tax base include only values that can be made available to shareholders
above and beyond their contributions"); McLure, supra note 57, at 535 (stating that "so far as
the earning of income for tax purposes is concerned, the corporation is simply the aggregate
of its owners"). But cf. Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83
YALE L.J. 1585, 1593 (1974) (arguing that defining corporate gain with reference to the gain
of the shareholders is not mandated conceptually by traditional notions of "income").
65. See Bryan, supra note 64, at 107-20 (discussing the statutory bases for this definition).
66. Gabinet & Coffey, The Implicationsof the Economic Concept of Incomefor CorporationShareholder Income Tax Systems, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 895, 915 (1977); Warren, supra
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corporate income during a specific period measures the increase in
value or economic gain to the shareholders that accrues through the
entity during that period, whether the increase is distributed to them
or remains inherent in their equity interest.
Defining corporate income in these terms illustrates that distributions to shareholders are analogous, for a corporate taxpayer, to an
individual taxpayer's expenditures for consumption.67 Under the most
widely-accepted definition, personal income is defined as the sum of
amounts spent on consumption plus changes in net worth, i.e., amounts
accumulated for future consumption.- The income formulation must

note 64, at 1592 (accepting this formula if corporate income is defined with reference to shareholder gain); see also P. HANSEN, THE ACCOUNTING CONCEPT OF PROFIT 39 (2d ed. 1972);
Sorter, Accounting Income and Economic Income, in 2 AICPA, OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS 104-05 (1973).
Since a deduction is denied for federal taxes under Internal Revenue Code § 275, the federal
tax rates are imposed on a "tax inclusive" base. Accordingly, the formula for the corporate
income tax base must include an amount for federal taxes. Such a payment or liability does not
represent a distribution to shareholders, nor is it a decrease in net worth that is recognized as
a loss for tax purposes. Corporate income on which the tax is imposed is therefore actually
equal to (1) net distributions to shareholders (distributions minus advances); plus (or minus) (2)
changes in corporate net worth (amounts accumulated for future distributions); plus (3) the
amount of nondeductible federal taxes.
For example, if a corporation earns $25 profit in one year and accrues federal taxes at a
40% rate, it will owe $10 tax and have $15 remaining after-tax to distribute to shareholders or
to accumulate for future distribution. Under the formula expressed in the text, the corporation
would appear to have only $15 income if it distributed the $15 to shareholders ($15 distribution
plus 0 change in net worth); it would also appear to have only $15 income if it accumulated the
$15 for future distributions (0 distributions plus $15 increase in net worth). The addition of the
$10 nondeductible tax payment gives the correct result that the firm's income for purposes of
the tax base is actually $25.
67. See Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 396 (1983) (analogizing between
consumption for an individual taxpayer and distributions to shareholders for a corporate taxpayer
in the context of the tax benefit. rule). Discussing whether nonrecognition should override the
tax benefit rule for a liquidating corporation, the Court stated, "[I]f a corporation turns expensed
assets to the analog of personal consumption, as [the taxpayer] did here - distribution to
shareholders - it would seem that it should take into income the amount of the earlier deduction."
Id. (citing Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Cl. Ct. 1961)). In Williamson, the Claims
Court held that a cash basis corporation should recognize gain on a liquidating distribution of
accounts receivable. Williamson, 292 F.2d at 530. The Williamson court stated that "[playing
the dividend was the enjoyment of its income. A body corporate can be said to enjoy its income
in no other way." Id.
See also Warren, supra note 64, at 1591-92 (analyzing consumption and accumulation in the
corporate context); Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets in Corporate Liquidations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1636, 1645-46 (1982) (corporate distribution represents a form of
consumption that benefits the corporation).
68. See Haig, The Concept of Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (R.Haig ed.
1921). In 1921 Professor Haig defined income as "the money value of the net accretion of one's
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include amounts spent on consumption; those expenditures evidence
the taxpayer's economic gain despite the fact that the individual is
left with fewer assets after the expenditure than before. Consumption
expenses may not be deductible or the concept of economic gain would
be defeated and the personal tax base could be eliminated altogether.
Similarly, corporate distributions to shareholders are evidence of gain
to the shareholders and consequently gain to the corporate entity.
Just as individual consumption expenses, distributions to shareholders
must be included in the corporate income formulation, and, just as
nondeductible and are intended to be
consumption expenses, they are
69

made out of after-tax dollars.

economic power between two points of time." Id. (emphasis in original). Professor Simons rearticulated Haig's definition, adding to it the element of consumption (an idea that he attributed
to Haig). H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62 (1938). As Simons defined it,
personal income is the "algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption
and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end
of the period in question." Id. at 50. For discussions of the Haig-Simons definition as the base
of personal income, see B. BiTTKER, C.

GALVIN,

R. MUSGRAVE & J. PECHMAN, A Comt-

A DEBATE 8 (1968); Andrews, PersonalDeductions in an
Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 320-25 (1972); Turnier, Personal Deductions and
Tax Reform: The High Road and the Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1703, 1705 (1986).
The federal personal tax rates are imposed on a 'tax inclusive" basis, given the nondeductibility of federal taxes under I.R.C. § 275. Accordingly, federal taxes are included in the computation of personal income for tax purposes, just as they are included in the computation of
corporate income for tax purposes. See supra note 66. In the case of personal income, federal
taxes might be included as consumption, although the private benefit derived from the expenditure does not correlate with the amount owed. See Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions
in an Income Tax - The Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 262, 272-75 (1981).
In any case, whether federal taxes are or are not deductible is a matter of the rate of tax,
and the rate on a "tax-inclusive" base may be converted into the rate needed to raise the same
amount of revenue on a "tax-exclusive" base. See M. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION,
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 114-15 (2d ed. 1988); Turnier, supra, at 267.
69. Despite the inclusion of distributions to shareholders in corporate income, such distributions are not always taxable to the corporation in the year they are made. Just as an individual's
consumption may be purchased out of previously-taxed savings, so distributions to shareholders
may be made out of funds previously taxed at the corporate level. Distributions also may be
made out of previous shareholder contributions, which are treated as corporate after-tax capital.
See Bryan, supra note 64, at 110. In either case, the distribution will be matched by an equivalent
reduction in corporate net worth, preventing taxation in the year of the distribution.
To illustrate, assume that a corporation receives $100 in initial shareholder contributions.
Under the formula (distributions to shareholders minus advances from them plus (or minus)
changes in corporate net worth), the $100 increase in corporate net worth will be offset by the
$100 in advances from shareholders, and the firm would have no income. This conclusion makes
sense since the shareholders have not enjoyed a gain, but simply have transferred funds from
direct ownership to entity ownership.
If, in the next year, the corporation has no profit but makes a $50 distribution to its
shareholders, that distribution would be deemed to be out of after-tax capital and so would not
PREHENSIVE INCOME TAX BASE?
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Distributions of Notes to Shareholders

If a corporation borrows cash to finance a distribution to its shareholders, the proceeds of the loan are not subject to tax. Therefore,
until repayment of the loan, the corporation achieves a distribution
to its shareholders out of pre-tax resources, a result that is inconsistent
with the corporate tax base. The inconsistency is corrected, of course,
when the corporation repays the loan. Since the repayment is nondeductible and consequently out of after-tax dollars, it is the same
(aside from timing) as if the original distribution had come from aftertax funds.
If the corporation borrows to finance a distribution to its shareholders and the debt is later cancelled, consistency requires that corporate
income include the debt at the time of cancellation. Otherwise, without
repayment, the prior tax-free borrowing becomes permanently exempt
from corporate tax. Likewise, the prior distribution to shareholders
becomes, in effect, a deductible outlay for the corporation. Either
result is inconsistent with the corporate tax base. Taxing the debt
upon cancellation, or the discount upon a repurchase of the debt,
assures the same goal as repayment of the debt: the corporation
achieves a distribution to shareholders only by paying tax on that
amount, thus preserving the system of double tax on shareholder gain.
This analysis should not be affected if a corporation finances a
distribution by borrowing from its shareholders rather than from a
third party, distributing notes rather than loan proceeds. Under current tax provisions, the notes will be treated as accomplishing a distribution to shareholders just as if the corporation instead had distributed cash in an amount equal to the value of the notes.
If the distribution is characterized as a dividend, the shareholders
70
will treat the value of the notes as dividend income on receipt. If

be taxed in the year of the distribution. The $50 distribution would be included in corporate
income but would be offset by an equivalent $50 reduction in the firm's net worth. Unless
distributions are viewed as analogous to consumption, the firm appears to have a loss. The
result of no corporate income is, however, consistent with the lack of actual gain (or loss) to
the shareholders.
The same result holds if the corporation has no profit but makes a $50 distribution out of
accumulated earnings or amounts taxed in a prior year. In this case, as in the example above,
the $50 distribution is offset by the $50 decrease in net worth, and the corporation has no
income. Again, unless distributions to shareholders are included in corporate income, the corporation appears to have a loss. The conclusion that the corporation has no loss is, of course,
consistent with the policy that dividends to shareholders are not deductible for tax purposes.
70. See, e.g., Doerschuck v. United States, 274 F. 739, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1921) (where the
court distinguished a dividend in bonds, taxable on receipt, from a nontaxable stock dividend
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the corporation distributes the notes in redemption of stock and the
redemption is treated as a payment for the stock, the shareholders
will compute gain or loss by comparing their basis in the stock to the
value of the notes. 71 In either case, the shareholders will take a basis
in the notes equal to the amount they included in income and will use
that basis to compute future gain or loss on the debt.7 The shareholders may sell the notes to third parties for cash or they may choose
to retain the notes as nonequity investments in the corporation. Any

gains or losses realized by them or by subsequent transferees on
disposition, satisfaction or cancellation of the notes will be realized in
the holder's role as a corporate creditor, a third party vis-A-vis the

corporation."
The corporation is also treated as if it had distributed cash equal
to the value of the note. Earnings and profits, measuring the corporate
gain available for distribution to shareholders, are reduced by that
amount if the distribution is a dividend or by a pro rata portion if the
distribution is a redemption treated as a sale of stock.7 4

on the grounds that with the former the shareholders receive an actual payment of property
"entirely severed or distinguished from their control of the property as stockholders"). For the
statutory authority, see I.R.C. §§ 301(b), (c) and 316, governing the tax treatment of distributions
of "property" to shareholders. Section 317 defines property for purposes of the distribution rules
to include "money, securities, and any other property; except that such term does not include
stock in the corporation making the distribution (or rights to acquire such stock)." I.R.C. § 317.
Section 312(a), governing the reduction in earnings and profits on distributions of property,
makes it clear that "property" includes obligations of the distributing corporation. I.R.C. §
312(a); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(d)(1)(ii) (CCH 1990).
71. See I.R.C. §§ 301-302. Amounts distributed in redemption of stock will be treated as
payments only if one of the tests under I.R.C. § 302 is met. Otherwise, the distribution will
be governed by I.R.C. § 301 and will be treated as a dividend assuming sufficient corporate
earnings and profits.
72. See I.R.C. §§ 301(d), 1012.
73. It is possible that a shareholder who is also a creditor holding corporate notes might
cancel those notes as a contribution to capital. If, for example, a shareholder cancelled corporate
debt in order to protect her equity investment, the holder's action would be related to her role
as shareholder. The shareholder-creditor would not realize a loss on the cancellation, but would
increase her stock basis by her basis in the cancelled debt. The consequences to the corporation
would also change. For further discussion on this point, see infra note 80.
74. I.R.C. § 312(a)(2). This section provides that a corporation that distributes notes shall
reduce earnings and profits by the principal amount or, if the notes are issued with original
issue discount, by the aggregate issue price of the notes. Id. Under I.R.C. § 312(o), the terms
"issue price" and "original issue discount" are to be defined for earnings and profits purposes
as they are under I.R.C. §§ 1273-1275, which control the computation of original issue discount.
I.R.C. § 312(o). If the issue price of notes distributed to shareholders is less than the face
amount, so that the issue price controls the charge to earnings and profits, the difference
between the face amount and the issue price will reduce earnings and profits ratably over the
term of the notes as the corporation deducts the original issue discount.
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In addition, if the face amount of the notes is greater than their
value on distribution, the corporation may deduct the difference ratably over the term of the notes as interest. 75 Under this tax provision,
the corporation is treated exactly as if it borrowed the cash from a
third party and then distributed the cash to its shareholders. When
a corporation borrows firom a third party, the excess of the face amount
of the notes over the cash received, typically equal to the value of
the notes on issuance, is deemed original issue discount and is deductible as a corporate expense for the use of money. 76 By according the

If the note is issued in redemption of stock and is treated as a sale, only a portion of the
note's face amount (or issue price, if less) would reduce earnings and profits, with that portion
not to exceed a ratable share of earnings and profits. See I.R.C. § 312(n)(7); B. BrrKER & J.
EUSTICE, supra note 23, 9.35.
The fact that the face amount of the note (or the issue price, if less) governs the reduction
in earnings and profits for notes that are issued to shareholders provides support for the rule
that a corporation should recognize gain on a repurchase of the note for less than the face
amount (or issue price). See B. BIrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note 20, 6.4.2 n.28:
Assume a corporation distributes a $100 bond as a dividend, and sometime later,
after interest rates have risen, the corporation redeems the bond for $80. The
corporation is out of pocket $80, but its earnings and profits have been reduced
by $100. If $20 of discharge of indebtedness income is recognized on the redemption,
however, this income generates additional earnings and profits that square the
earnings and profits account with the economics of the transaction. The earnings
and profits rule, in other words, implies that discharge of indebtedness is recognized
on a repurchase at less than face of a bond distributed as a dividend.
Id.
75. If the notes are issued as dividends, the issue price for original issue discount purposes
will be determined under § 1275(a)(5) as if the notes were issued for property. Accordingly, if
the notes are publicly traded, their fair market value will be the issue price. See I.R.C. §
1273(b)(3). If the notes are not publicly traded, the issue price will be determined under the
rules of § 1274, which utilize the interest rates on federal debt.
If the notes are issued in redemption of stock, § 1273(b)(3) will set the issue price as the
fair market value of the stock or debt if either one is publicly traded. Otherwise, the rules
under § 1274 will control. See generally B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 23, T 4.42.
Once the issue price is determined, original issue discount (defined under § 1273(a) as the
excess of the stated redemption price at maturity over the issue price) is deductible to the
issuer under § 163(e). I.R.C. § 163(e).
76. If a note is issued for cash, its issue price for purposes of original issue discount is
determined under § 1273(b)(1) or (2). Unless the note is publicly offered, its issue price will be
the amount of cash paid by the first buyer. If the note is publicly offered, the issue price will
be the initial offering price at which a substantial amount of the debt was sold. See B. BIrFrKER
& J. EUSTICE, supra note 23,
4.41, 4-59. If the exchange is arm's length, the amount received
for the debt typically will be equal to the value of the debt. See United States v. Davis, 370
U.S. 65, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
The difference between the issue price and the stated value on maturity is defined as original
issue discount under § 1273(a) and is deductible to the issuer under § 163(e).
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same treatment to a corporation that finances shareholder distributions
by borrowing directly from its shareholders as is accorded transactions
between the corporation and third party creditors, the tax code makes
it clear that the distribution of notes to shareholders closes the distribution transaction at that point. Any future payments to holders of
the notes are considered to be payments to third party creditors.
Once it is clear that the transaction between the corporation and
its shareholders closes at the time the corporation distributes the
notes, the analysis of whether the corporation recognizes gain on a
cancellation or a repurchase of the debt presents few problems. Just
as when borrowed cash is distributed to shareholders, the corporation
distributing notes has achieved a distribution to shareholders without
an equivalent investment of its own. The distribution is effectively
deductible to the corporation, an inconsistency with the corporate tax
base that is corrected when the corporation pays the notes out of
after-tax funds. If such payment does not occur, because the debt is
either cancelled or repurchased at a discount, inclusion at that point
is the only way to preserve the nondeductibility of shareholder distributions and to maintain consistency with the double tax.
The same analysis applies to an individual taxpayer who borrows
to finance consumption, an expense that is nondeductible from the
individual tax base. If, for example, an individual purchases $100 of
consumption on credit, she is not taxed on the value of the consumption
because of her repayment obligation. If, subsequently, she satisfies
the debt for less than $100, she should be taxed on the discount.She has enjoyed $100 consumption without an equivalent investment
of her own, a result that is inconsistent with the personal tax base.
The difference between the obligation and the amount repaid is taxed
as gain in order to preserve the nondeductibility of consumption.
The problem in United States Steel arose from defining economic
income only as an increase in accumulations. Relying on Kirby Lumber,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals determined that an "increase in
assets" was the critical determinant of gain from the cancellation of

77. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, supranote 60, at 58 n.30; Eustice, Cancellationof Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REV. 225,
244 (1959); Gunn, Reconciling, supra note 14, at 854 n.20.
Exclusion of gain from cancellation of a debt incurred for consumption might be justified if
the cancellation is viewed as a retroactive adjustment in the purchase price. In that case, if
the taxpayer is deemed not to have originally received consumption benefits in the full amount
of the debt, the taxpayer will not have realized an economic benefit when the debt is cancelled
for less than the original amount owed. As an analogy, see I.R.C. § 108(e)(5) (treating the
reduction of debt owed by the purchaser to the seller of property as a price reduction, reducing
the basis in the property, instead of taxing the debtor on gain from the cancellation of the debt).
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debt.-8 That conclusion makes sense when the borrowing is for cash
or other property, but is incorrect when the borrowing is for consumption (in the case of an individual) or for a distribution to shareholders
(in the case of a corporation). Neither use increases the assets of the
taxpayer and yet both are components of the tax base. If an individual
taxpayer consumes, the consumption is included in the tax base and
is to be accomplished out of after-tax funds; if a corporate taxpayer
distributes to shareholders, the distribution is included in the tax base
and is to be accomplished out of after-tax funds. Enjoying consumption
or achieving a distribution without an equivalent outlay of funds is an
economic benefit - to the individual in one case and to the corporation
in the other - and should result in taxable gain.
This conclusion in the case of a corporate taxpayer may be illustrated further by considering the principle that corporate income is
defined with reference to shareholder gain. When a corporation issues
a note with a fixed rate of interest, whether to its shareholders or to
a third party lender, the note may be viewed as an asset with a
fluctuating value. If market interest rates rise, the value of the debt
increases to the corporate debtor, who would be forced to pay higher
interest rates were it not for the contractual commitment. The appreciation increases the corporate net worth, and the gain accrues to the
shareholders through their stock interests.
As the corporate debtor enjoys a gain with rising market interest
rates, the creditors suffer a loss. The fixed interest rate in the note
no longer compensates the creditors adequately for the use of their
money, and the present value of the principal payment on maturity
and the periodic interest payments falls below the value of the debt
when issued. The loss suffered by the third party creditors is equivalent to the gain enjoyed by the corporate entity and so by its share7
holders. The gain accruing to the shareholders as the debt increases in
value to the corporate debtor is realized by the shareholders if they
sell their stock. To be consistent with the double tax, the corporate
tax base should include that same gain as corporate income. If the
corporation repurchases the debt at a discount from its initial value,
realization to the corporation will occur at that point, and the gain,
represented by the difference between the initial value and the repurchase price, should be taxed at the corporate level.

78.
79.

See United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1236.
See Bryan, supra note 64, at 121-23.
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The gain realized upon the repurchase of a debt should not depend
upon whether the debt was initially issued to shareholders or to third
party lenders. In either case, the holders of the debt are third party
creditors, unrelated to the corporate entity. The loss the creditors
suffer as the debt declines in value represents a gain to the corporation
and to its shareholder group, and it is that gain which is the subject
of the double tax.a
C.

Rail Joint -

A Faulty Precedent

One of the main cases cited by United States Steel in its favor
and relied upon by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in its opinion
was Commissioner v. Rail Joint Co.81 Rail Joint was decided by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals shortly after the Supreme Court

80. It is crucial to this analysis that the loss realized on a repurchase or cancellation of the
debt by the corporation is suffered by a third party creditor. If, for example, the debt were
cancelled by a creditor who was also a shareholder and the cancellation occurred in order to
protect the creditor-shareholder's equity investment, the analysis would change. In that case,
the creditor-shareholder would be deemed to have made a capital contribution to the corporation
to the extent of her basis in the cancelled debt and would increase her basis in the stock by
that amount. Under I.R.O. § 108(e)(6), the corporation would be treated as satisfying the debt
with an amount of money equal to the shareholder's adjusted basis in the indebtedness. Thus,
the corporation would realize income only to the extent that the face amount (or the issue price)
exceeded that basis.
This rule is consistent with the formula for corporate income described in the text, since
the additional shareholder investment in the corporation would offset cancellation of indebtedness
income that would otherwise be realized. See Bryan, supra note 64, at 124-25 (If the shareholder
has an inherent loss in the debt - i.e., her basis is greater than the fair market value of the
debt - the loss of that shareholder will be offset by gain to the rest of the shareholders. This
conclusion justifies the result of no gain to the corporation as an entity.).
Difficulties will arise in some cases in determining whether the cancellation of a debt was
related to a shareholder-creditor's status as a shareholder or as a creditor. The Senate Finance
Committee recognized that the corporation would have to face this issue under I.R.C. § 108(e)(6)
and, in its committee report on that section, stated:
Whether a cancellation of indebtedness by a shareholder-creditor is a contribution
to capital depends upon the facts of the particular case. In order for the contribution
to capital rule to apply, the shareholder's action in cancelling the debt must be
related to his status as a shareholder. If the shareholder-creditoracts merely as
a creditor attempting to maximize the satisfaction of a claim, such as where the
stock and bonds are publicly held and the creditor simply happens also to be a
shareholder,the cancellation of the indebtedness on exchange of the bondsfor stock
is not to be treated as a contribution to capital by a shareholderfor purposes of
this rule.
S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 n.22 (1980) (emphasis added).
81. 61 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1932).
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decided Kirby Lumber, the case in which the Court established that
the repurchase of a debt at a discount would result in taxable gain.In Rail Joint, the corporate taxpayer had declared and paid a
dividend in its own bonds. Almost ten years later, the taxpayer repurchased the bonds for less than their face amount. The government
relied on Kirby Lumber, arguing that the difference between the decrease in the taxpayer's liabilities and the decrease in its assets should
be taxable as gain. 84 The Second Circuit, however, concluded that
Kirby Lumber was not controlling.The distinguishing factor, according to the Second Circuit, was the
lack of consideration received by the debtor upon incurring the debt. 6
In Kirby Lumber, according to the Second Circuit, the debtor had
received cash upon issuing the debt.17 When the debtor subsequently
retired the bonds by paying less cash than it had received, it "obtained
a net gain in assets from the transaction." 8 In contrast, the debtor
in Rail Joint "never received any increment to its assets, either at
the time the bonds were delivered [to the shareholders] or at the time
they were retired."' 9 When it repurchased the bonds at a discount, it
simply paid those shareholders less than it had promised to pay them.
Without a net gain in assets, considering the transactions in the aggregate, the court could not justify taxing the debtor.While the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals cited Rail Joint as
authority in United States Steel, the Rail Joint opinion has been
criticized by commentators 9' and should not be followed. The Second

82. The Supreme Court decided Kirby Lumber, 284 U.S. 1 (1931), after the Board of Tax
Appeals issued its opinion in Rail Joint. The Second Circuit was asked to reverse the Board's
holding on the basis of the new authority, which it declined to do. Rail Joint, 61 F.2d at 751-52.
83. See Rail Joint, 61 F.2d at 751.
84. See id. at 752.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 751. Actually, the debtor in Kirby Lumber had issued the debt in exchange for
its own preferred stock rather than, as the Second Circuit erroneously assumed, for cash. See
Bittker, supra note 46, at 126.
88. Rail Joint, 61 F.2d at 751.
89. Id. at 752.
90. Id. The court recognized that cancellation of a liability might result in tax without a
net gain in assets if the liability previously had been deductible, as some liabilities would be
for an accrual basis taxpayer. The court concluded, however, that that principle was not applicable to the case at bar since the dividend obligation was not a deductible liability. See id.
91. See, e.g., R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 257-59 (rev. ed. 1945); Bittker & Thompson,
supra note 60, at 1167; Warren & Sugarman, Cancellation of Indebtedness and Its Tax Consequences: I, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1326, 1332-33 (1940); Note, Book PrQfits as Taxable Income,
82 U. PA. L. REV. 641, 645 (1934). Some authors have stated that the transaction in Rail Joint
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Circuit was clearly wrong when it stated that a receipt of assets upon
incurring a debt is a necessary finding in order to charge the debtor
with gain upon the cancellation of the debt, and subsequent court
decisions and commentators have rejected that view.- When a debtor
incurs a debt, she may receive assets or other types of economic
benefits in return. If, for instance, a debtor incurs a $100 debt for
consumption and that debt is later cancelled, the debtor should be
taxed on $100 gain in order to assure that consumption benefits are
obtained out of after-tax dollars. Without that tax, the debtor will
have received $100 consumption without any investment of her own,
a result that is inconsistent with the personal tax base.9 This result
is correct despite the lack of an increase in the debtor's assets as a
result of the overall transaction.
As discussed previously, consumption in the computation of personal income is analogous to distributions to shareholders in the computation of corporate incomeA" Accordingly, the individual debtor's
situation above is analogous to a corporate debtor that distributed
$100 in notes to its shareholders. If those notes are cancelled, the
corporate debtor must be taxed on $100 in order to assure that the
previous distribution is effectively made with after-tax funds. Without
such a tax, the corporation achieves a $100 distribution with pre-tax
funds, a result that is inconsistent with the corporate tax base. If the
corporate debtor repurchases the notes at a discount, the debtor should
be taxed to the extent of that discount. Again, this result is correct
despite the lack of any increase in the corporate debtor's assets.
The decision in Rail Joint perhaps can be explained by the court's
disregard of the distribution of the bonds as a true distribution to
shareholders. Rather, the court seemed to regard the bond distribution
as a transitory step, preliminary to the distribution of cash to the
shareholders either on repayment or repurchase of the bonds. 95 Thus,

should be analogized to an issuance of the bonds for cash, followed by a distribution of the cash
as a dividend and a subsequent repurchase of the bonds at a discount. If these steps had been
followed, the repurchase unquestionably would have resulted in taxable gain to the corporation.
See, e.g., Bittker & Thompson, supra note 60, at 1167; Note, supra, at 645. But see Darrell,
Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax, 53 HARV. L. REv. 977, 982-93 (1940)
(for the view that such a recharacterization should not control).
92. See, e.g., Darrell, supra note 91, at 981; Eustice, supra note 77, at 244; Warren &
Sugarman, supra note 91, at 1331-33.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
95. See Rail Joint, 61 F.2d at 752. However, the Board of Tax Appeals in Rail Joint
recognized that the shareholders would be taxed on the receipt of the bonds. See Rail Joint,
22 B.T.A. at 1278.
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the court stated that on repurchase of the bonds "all that happened
was that the corporation . . . paid those shareholders whose bonds
were redeemed at a discount, less than it had promised to pay them."9
The court clearly did not view the shareholders as creditors to the
extent of their holdings of the corporate debt; instead it viewed them
as retaining shareholder status, holding the promise that the corpora97
tion would distribute a cash dividend to them in the future.
In effect, the Second Circuit in Rail Joint held the dividend distribution open for tax purposes until cash was finally distributed.- Such
treatment of a distribution of notes is inconsistent, however, with
other provisions of the Code previously described.- Shareholders who
receive a distribution of notes, whether as a dividend or in redemption
of stock, must take the notes into account upon receipt. The shareholders must include the value of the notes in income or, in redemption
transactions, subtract their stock basis from the value of the notes to
determine gain.' The shareholders take a basis in the notes equal to
their value in order to determine subsequent gain or loss to be realized
in their new role as creditors. 101 If the notes are transferable (or traded
on an established securities market, as they were in United States
Steel10 2), the shareholders may choose to exchange the notes for cash,
with the new buyers taking their place as corporate creditors.
On the corporate side, the corporation must treat the distribution
of the notes the same as a distribution of cash, reducing earnings and
profits by the full value if the distribution constitutes a dividend and
by a proportionate amount if the distribution is a redemption treated
as a sale of the stock. 103 Subsequent payments on the notes are treated
as payments made to creditors, and original issue discount based on
the difference between the face amount of the notes and their value
is deducted ratably over the term.1°4
Given these provisions, the Second Circuit's treatment of the distribution of notes as a transitory step on the way to the eventual
distribution of cash is inconsistent with current law. Under current
law, the distribution of notes, whether as a dividend or in redemption

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Rail Joint, 61 F.2d at 752.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
See authorities cited supra notes 70-71.
See authorities cited supra note 72.
Appellant's Brief at 4-5, United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1232.
See authorities cited supra note 74.
See authorities cited supra note 75.
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of stock, is treated as a cash distribution both by the shareholders
and by the corporation. Future transactions between the corporation
and the holders are treated as occurring between the corporation and
any other third party creditors. Under this analysis, appreciation in
the value of the notes to the corporation with an equivalent depreciation to the creditors represents the shifting of wealth from third parties
to the corporate entity. That appreciation clearly represents gain to
the shareholder group and, as such, must be taxed when it is realized
by the corporation upon a repurchase of the notes at a discount.
D.

The Argument Against Inclusion Based Upon an Overall Loss

In addition to citing Rail Joint as authority for its position, United
States Steel argued against realization of gain on its repurchase of
the bonds by stressing that overall it had, in fact, paid out more assets
than it had received.105 United States Steel received $100 when it
issued the stock and no additional cash when it issued debt worth
$165 in exchange for each share of outstanding stock. 1°w Under this
analysis, incurring the liability without receipt of equivalent consideration appears to represent a loss to the corporation since the corporation's net asset value actually declined. When the taxpayer repurchased the debt by paying $118, a figure less than it promised to pay
but more than the $100 received for the stock, the taxpayer reduced
the overall loss. Under these circumstances, when the entire transaction resulted in a reduction of assets by $18 per share, the taxpayer
10 7
argued that it could not be deemed to have realized a gain.
This argument, accepted by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals,
has a superficial appeal under the facts of United States Steel. Authority does exist for the proposition that, despite the rule of annual
accounting, gain in one year that is actually a recovery of a loss
suffered in a prior year may be excluded from tax. Courts have justified this exclusion on the grounds that the apparent gain actually
represents a recovery of capital.108 Commentators and a few cases
have extended this theory to the cancellation-of-debt area.109 This

105. See Appellant's Brief at 11-12, 25, United States Steel, 848 F.2d at 1232.
106. Id. at 11-12. United States Steel had claimed the difference between the $165 value
of the debt and its $175 face amount as original issue discount and had deducted it ratably over

the term of the debt. Id. at 9.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 23; United States Steel, 11 Cl. Ct. at 378-79 n.12.
See infra text accompanying notes 110-23.
See infra text accompanying notes 126-28.
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theory is not, however, relevant to a corporation that repurchases
debt which was originally issued to shareholders and should be rejected
in cases such as United States Steel.
The tax-free recovery of capital stands as a basic premise of the
tax law, assuring that the taxpayer is taxed only on net gain. In many
cases, the recovery of capital is implemented by the mechanism of
basis, so that a taxpayer selling property is allowed to recover her
investment from the amount realized, with only the excess subject to
tax."10 In other cases, taxation of net gain is assured by allowing the
taxpayer to deduct costs incurred in earning income, with the deduction of the costs representing the recovery of capital.'
The concept of recovery of capital has been extended to justify the
exclusion of gain in cases in which the taxpayer suffered a prior loss
that either was not recognized for tax purposes or from which the
2
taxpayer did not obtain any tax benefit. In Dobson v. United States,"1
for example, the Supreme Court considered a taxpayer who purchased
3
several hundred shares of stock which he subsequently sold at a loss."
Although he had claimed the loss as a deduction, he had not obtained
any tax benefit. "4 In the year at issue, the taxpayer received a recovery for his loss from the original seller, whom he had sued for fraud,
but the recovery did not equal the taxpayer's entire investment in
the stock."!,
The taxpayer in Dobson successfully argued to the Supreme Court
that the recovery in the later year (resulting in a clear increase in his
net worth in that year) could not be taxed since it represented, in
effect, a return of his capital. Looking at the overall transaction, and
considering both the prior loss and the recovery, he enjoyed neither
a net gain nor a tax benefit.1I6 In agreeing with the taxpayer, the
Supreme Court stressed that its holding did not allow courts to reopen
the returns of prior years, but only allowed courts to look to prior
events in determining the nature of the recovery, whether return of
capital or income."17 While a deduction of the loss normally would have
allowed the taxpayer to recover his investment, a deduction with no

110. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
111. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 212. See generally B. BI'rrKER & L. LOKKEN, supra note
20, 5.4.
112. 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
113. Id. at 491.
114. Id. at 492.
115. Id. at 491-92.
116. Id. at 492.
117. See id. at 493.
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tax effect did not do so. 11s Exclusion of the subsequent recovery was

the only way to assure that the taxpayer was not overtaxed.119
Dobson involved a case where the loss was deductible, but the
taxpayer obtained no tax benefit from the deduction. Its rationale has
been extended to exclude recoveries of prior losses that were not
deductible although they represented a clear reduction in the taxpayer's net worth. Clark v. Commissioner12° exemplifies such a case,

with the court again justifying an exclusion on the grounds of recovery
of capital.121 In Clark, a taxpayer paid federal taxes that had been
computed improperly by an accountant. The accountant, upon discovering the mistake in a subsequent year, paid the taxpayer cash in the
amount of the increase in taxes which his negligence caused. 12 The
Board of Tax Appeals concluded that the payment did not constitute
income to the taxpayer but instead merely represented compensation
for an earlier loss. Because that loss had not been recognized for tax
purposes, the recovery was excluded as a return of capital.123
In Dobson, Clark, and other similar cases, courts have adopted a
transactional approach in preference to annual accounting. 124The courts
have concluded that gain in one year should be excluded from income
if it is characterized as a return of capital. That characterization is

118. Id. at 491-92.
119. The principle articulated in Dobson sometimes is referred to as the exclusionary aspect
of the tax benefit rule and is now codified in I.R.C. § 111. See generally Bittker & Kanner,
The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REV. 265 (1978); White, An Essay on the Conceptual
Foundations of the Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MICH. L. REV. 486 (1983); Note, The Tax Benefit
Rule and the Loss CarryoverProvisionsof the 1954 Code, 67 YALE L.J. 1395 (1958) [hereinafter
Note, Loss Carryover Provisions]. Although the predecessor to I.R.C. § 111 had been enacted
at the time Dobson was decided, it applied only to recoveries of bad debts, prior taxes, and
delinquency amounts. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 22(b)(2) Stat. (now I.R.C. § 111).
After Dobson, the Treasury Regulations under that section were expanded to cover "all other
losses, expenditures, and accruals made the basis of deductions from gross income." T.D. 5454,
1945-1 C.B. 68. Subsequent court decisions continued the broad application of the rule approved
by the Supreme Court in Dobson. See authorities cited in Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim
of Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Cure for the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 995, 1001 (1968) [hereinafter Note, Claim of Right Restorations]. The current version of
I.R.C. § 111 excludes "income attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of any
amount deducted in any prior taxable year to the extent such amount did not reduce the amount
of tax imposed by this chapter."
120. 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), acq. 1957-1 C.B. 4, nonacq. 1939-2 C.B. 45 withdrawrn.
121. Id. at 335.
122. Id. at 334.
123. Id. at 335.
124. See Bittker & Kanner, supra note 119, at 270; Note, Claim of Right Restorations,
supra note 119, at 1005-06; Note, Loss Carryover Provisions, supra note 119, at 1394-95.
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made if, considering the events of prior years, the court finds that
the taxpayer has not enjoyed a net economic gain. Although the taxpayer enjoys an increase in net worth in the year of the recovery,
looked at in isolation, the increase is offset by an earlier decline in
net worth that was not recognized for tax purposes. The exclusion of
the subsequent recovery balances the nonrecognition of the earlier
loss so that the taxpayer is taxed only on net gain.12
A few courts have extended this analysis to the cancellation-of-debt
area,'2" and some commentators have viewed the cases as establishing
an exception to the normal rule that the cancellation of debt results
in a gain to the debtor.12 These cases seem to depend on a finding
that the debtor received no readily ascertainable economic benefit
upon incurring the debt. Incurring the liability decreased the taxpayer's net worth, representing a loss, but it was not recognized as
such through a deduction for the taxpayer. If the debt is subsequently
cancelled, the taxpayer has not enjoyed an overall gain, considering
the years in the aggregate. Any increase in the taxpayer's net worth
from the cancellation of the debt simply reduces the prior decrease
in net worth. Exclusion of the gain from cancellation of the debt
balances the prior nonrecognition of the loss.128

125. It is certainly arguable whether the exclusion described in the text represents the
most effective way to achieve transactional equity. If a taxpayer suffers a loss that reduces the
amount she has available to consume, it would make most sense to allow her a deduction at
that point. If the deduction cannot be utilized in that year, it could be added to a loss carryover
(unlimited in time) for offsetting income in a subsequent year. As a result, the taxpayer would
not be taxed on gain (looking at the years in the aggregate) until the loss had been deducted.
If such deductions or additions to loss carryovers were allowed, then recoveries clearly would
be taxable. Theoretically, it is the loss that should be deductible rather than the recovery that
should be excludable. See Note, Loss Carryover Provisions, supra note 119, at 1419-20.
By excluding recoveries on the basis of a prior nondeductible loss, the system discriminates
against taxpayers who suffer the loss but do not enjoy the recovery. Clearly they have less
ability to consume than those who suffer the loss but then recover some amount, even though
both groups of taxpayers are taxed in the same manner. Equity is, however, achieved between
those groups of taxpayers who suffer the loss and recover and those who never suffered the
loss at all. If the recovery were taxed, those who suffered the loss and recovered would be in
a worse position than if they had never suffered the loss at all.
126. See, e.g., Bradford v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956); Ruben v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 926 (8th Cir. 1938).
127. See, e.g., Darrell, supra note 91, at 981; Eustice, supra note 77, at 244; Gunn, The
Functional Approach, supra note 14, at 213-14; Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the
Income Tax Treatment of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 YALE L.J. 1153, 1173-75 (1940).
But see Warren & Sugarman, supra note 91, at 1329-33 (discharging indebtedness for amount
less than that owed clearly saves money and therefore is gain to the debtor).
128. See authorities cited supra notes 125-26; see also Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner,
790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986).
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While the judicial authority for this argument is limited, commentators have given examples of debts that could be cancelled without
giving rise to gain. Most often cited are obligations to make charitable
contributions or to pay a tort liability that are later cancelled or settled
at a discount. In these cases, some commentators have stated that
the cancellation should not give rise to taxable gain, but should simply
be viewed as reducing the previous nondeductible loss.-m
Although not fully explained, the recovery of capital theory appears
to be the basis of the argument made by United States Steel. United
States Steel argued that it received no economic benefit when it issued
the debt to its shareholders in redemption of their stock. The only
asset United States Steel received in connection with the entire transaction was the cash, $100 per share, originally paid in by its shareholders on the issuance of the preferred stock. Thus, the reduction in
United States Steel's net worth upon incurring the debt, at least to
the extent the debt exceeded $100 per share, was a loss, although
the debt was not deductible when incurred and would not be deductible
when paid. Under these circumstances, paying less than promised
(although more than $100) simply reduced the overall loss rather than
creating any overall gain. Excluding gain in the year of repurchase
was the only way to assure that the taxpayer was not overtaxed since
the taxpayer realized no net economic gain looking at the years in the
130
aggregate.
The problem with this argument in United States Steel is that the
argument is based upon viewing the debt to the shareholders as a
corporate loss, albeit a nondeductible one. That view of the debt,
however, is not consistent with the structure of the double tax. As
previously described, corporate income consists of two major components: distributions to shareholders and changes in net worth.1l1 While
the distribution of a note to shareholders reduces the firm's net asset
value, it is not a corporate loss.132 Instead, it is fully includable in
129. See authorities cited supra note 126.
If the liability that is cancelled would have been deductible when paid (such as most debts
to charities), the exclusion of any gain from cancellation of the debt is justified on accounting
principles. Thus, the cancellation benefits the debtor by removing her payment obligation but
it also deprives her of the deduction to the same extent. Any gain from the cancellation would
have to be offset by the deduction she would have obtained, so that she would realize no tax
consequences. This result is codified in I.R.C. § 108(e)(2).
130. See the argument as put forth by United States Steel in Appellant's Brief at 19-27
and as summarized by the Claims Court. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 11 Cl.
Ct. 375, 378 n.12 (1986).
131. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
132. Under the theory that corporate income is defined with reference to gain to its shareholders as described at the text accompanying notes 63-65, supra, a loss to the corporation

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 42

corporate income, and the corporation must be deemed to have realized
economic benefit to the full extent of the value of the note distributed.
Accordingly, a subsequent recovery of a portion of that debt results
in the taxpayer paying less than full value for the economic benefit
previously received. The difference between the economic benefit and
the amount paid must be taxed as a gain.
Again, the analogy between an individual's expenses for consumption and a corporation's distributions to shareholders serves as an
illustration.- An expense for consumption reduces an individual taxpayer's net assets and yet, since it is fully includable in the income
computation, is not regarded as a loss. A subsequent recovery of that
amount should be taxed as an economic gain, assuming that the taxpayer received full value from the original amounts spent. The theory
of recovery of capital, or the exclusion of gain as a reduction of a
prior loss, would be rejected in this case, just as it should be rejected
under facts such as those in United States Steel.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court in United States Steel was misled by the taxpayer's
emphasis on an increase in assets as the sole determinant of gain from
the cancellation of debt. That conclusion is incorrect for corporate
taxpayers who may borrow to make distributions to shareholders,
whether the borrowing is from third party creditors or from the shareholders themselves. In either case, the repurchase of a debt at a
discount from its initial value should result in taxable gain. Otherwise,
gain to the shareholders, represented by the appreciation in the value
of the debt, will remain untaxed at the corporate level, and the prior
distribution to shareholders effectively will be deductible to the corporation. Both results are clearly inconsistent with the structure of double taxation.
With the current prices of junk bonds encouraging issuer repurchases, the decision in United States Steel will have an increasing
impact on tax revenue. Under the holding of that case, corporate
debtors will not recognize gain on the repurchase of notes issued to
shareholders in redemption of their stock except in the unusual case
where the cash paid on repurchase is less than the amount originally
received for the stock. Corporate debtors will never recognize gain
on the repurchase of notes originally distributed as dividends.

should represent a reduction in the amounts available for future distribution to the shareholders.
Clearly, a distribution to shareholders cannot qualify as a corporate loss under this definition.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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Not only are these results inconsistent with the theoretical
framework of the Code, but they produce unnecessary distinctions
between corporations that choose to borrow from third parties to
achieve redemptions or dividends and those that borrow from shareholders to achieve the same result. The next court faced with the
question should reject the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
in United States Steel. Hopefully, that court will recognize that the
revenue loss produced by that decision is unwarranted. Both theoretical consistency in the tax laws and a coherent definition of the corporate tax base argue in favor of a different conclusion: that a corporation
that repurchases its own bonds at a discount should realize gain to
the extent of the discount, regardless of whether the bonds were
issued to third party creditors or directly to shareholders.
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